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Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship be-
tween frequency of scheduled transportation services and their substitutability with
personal transportation (using distance as a proxy). We study the interaction between
a monopoly rm providing a high-speed scheduled service and private transportation
(i.e., car). Interestingly, the carrier chooses to increase the frequency of service on
longer routes when competing with personal transportation because by providing higher
frequency (at extra cost) it can also charge higher fares which can boost its prots.
However, in line with the results of earlier studies, frequency decreases for longer ights
when driving is not a viable option. An empirical application of our analysis to the
European airline industry conrms the predictions of our theoretical model.
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1 Introduction
A problem faced by companies providing scheduled transportation (airlines, railway compa-
nies, etc.) is that it is impossible to achieve the level of mobility o¤ered by the use of a private
vehicle. Customers traveling by car do not have to bear a schedule delay cost inherent to the
limited choice of departure times that characterizes scheduled services. However, providers
of scheduled transportation can make their product more attractive when competing with
consumerspersonal vehicles by o¤ering high-frequency, high-speed services. There are also
cases in which driving is not a relevant alternative (when the distance between the endpoints
is particularly long), and in this case the problem facing a scheduled carrier is to make its
service attractive with respect to the option of not traveling at all. These two problems may
have di¤erent solutions; however, no di¤erentiation between them has been o¤ered in the
literature.
This paper lls this void by examining fare and frequency choices of a monopoly provider
of scheduled transportation services. We compare the case where the customers next best
available alternative is driving with the scenario where driving is not a relevant option (i.e.,
it is a dominated alternative). The model yields testable predictions regarding frequency-
distance relationships, which we put to the test using data from the European airline industry
(where services are provided by a single carrier on over sixty percent of airport-pair markets).
In the theoretical part, we model a carrier (which we will consider to be an airline,
although the analysis is easily applicable to high-speed rail as well) choosing fares and fre-
quency of services, given that it enjoys an exogenous advantage in terms of higher speed
of service than the private vehicle. This part builds on Brueckner (2004), Brueckner and
Flores-Fillol (2007) and Bilotkach (2006). Brueckner (2004) considers a monopoly airlines
network choice, incorporating decisions concerning frequency in the model. Brueckner and
Flores-Fillol (2007) use this framework to analyze fare and frequency choices in duopoly mar-
kets. Finally, Bilotkach (2006) introduces a valuation of time similar to the one we use here
in a model of airlinesnetwork choice.
We nd that the monopolists choice crucially depends on whether driving is a dominated
option or not. The carrier will reduce the frequency of service for longer trips when driving
is dominated but, more interestingly, the relationship between frequency and distance may
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reverse when driving is not dominated and carriers compete with personal transportation.
Our result is explained by a trade-o¤ between two forces. First, the provider of scheduled
transportation services will always incur an extra cost when increasing frequency. Indeed,
higher frequency implies additional xed costs and reduces the opportunity of exploiting
density economies which, in the case of airlines, arise from the use of bigger aircraft at
high load factors. Second, an increase in distance may boost the demand for high-speed
scheduled transportation services on short-haul routes where the use of personal vehicles is
a relevant option for travelers. This is because an increase in distance makes the high-speed
transportation mode more competitive and so providers of scheduled transportation services
are able to increase frequency and charge higher fares.
On short-haul routes, our theoretical model shows that the positive e¤ect of distance
on frequency derived from charging higher fares outweighs the negative e¤ect derived from
incurring extra costs. This explains the main result of our analysis: the positive relation-
ship between frequency and distance on routes where personal transportation is a relevant
option. However, on long-haul routes where driving is a dominated option, an increase in
distance does not necessarily imply an increase in the demand for scheduled services. Hence,
we can expect a negative relationship between frequency and distance since the provider of
scheduled services tries to minimize costs (and avoid potential travelers staying at home).
Finally, from the perspective of the social optimum, we nd that a monopoly carrier provides
lower frequency of service than is socially optimal and the number of passengers making use
of the scheduled transportation services is ine¢ ciently low (as is usual for models of this kind).
Our model relates to the issue of intermodal competition and choice of transport mode1
and, from a broader perspective, to the literature on product di¤erentiation. Since with
longer distances scheduled services become more attractive than personal transportation, due
to their higher speed, we study how the monopolists choice changes as the substitutability
between the two transportation options increases. Product di¤erentiation has been analyzed
in several studies of the airline industry (e.g., Berry, 1990, Berry et al., 1996, Borenstein
and Netz, 1999). However, these studies do not consider the way in which substitutable
1The issue of mode substitution and its e¤ects has been discussed, for example by Bel (1997), González-
Savignat (2004), Janic´ (2003) and López-Pita and Robusté (2004). Some studies on choice of transport mode
conclude that commuters mostly consider frequency of service (and more generally convenience of service) as
one of the factors determining their elasticity (Voith, 1997 and Asensio, 2002); or the impact of urban transit
projects (Baum-Snow and Kahn, 2000).
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transportation options inuence carriersfrequency choices.
We test the predictions of our theoretical model concerning the relationship between the
length of haul and frequency using data on annual frequencies at the airline-route level. Our
sample includes about 900 routes that link the ten largest airports in Europe with other
European destinations (EU27 + Switzerland and Norway) in the period 2006-2007. The em-
pirical application examines the relationship between airlinesfrequency choices and distance
controlling for demand shifters at the route level, the intensity of competition and airline
attributes. A spline regression that shows the relationship between frequency and distance
in our dataset, makes it advisable to di¤erentiate between routes shorter and longer than
500 kilometers (311 miles). Interestingly, the empirical application shows that airlinesfre-
quency increases with distance for routes shorter than 500 kilometers. In contrast, frequency
decreases with distance for routes longer than 500 kilometers. Thus, the predictions of the
theoretical model are conrmed. As expected, frequency increases with demand (captured
by several variables). We also nd that airlines compete aggressively in frequency of service,
low-cost carriers provide lower quality products, and airport presence strongly inuences the
number of ights that airlines o¤er on the routes served.
Previous empirical work has analyzed the determinants of ight frequency. In fact, our
empirical application is closely related to the studies by Pai (2007) and Wei and Hansen
(2007). Pai (2007) estimates the determinants of ight frequency in the US airline mar-
ket, observing a decreasing relationship between frequency and distance. From a di¤erent
perspective, Wei and Hansen (2007) develop an application for three game-theoretic models
of airline choices, obtaining that frequency on long-haul routes is less than on short-haul
routes. These ndings are in line with our results when driving is a dominated option. Thus,
although these two previous studies adequately explain the relationship between frequency
and distance on long-haul routes, our results suggest that the applicability of their ndings
to short-haul markets is limited.2
To sum up, the main contribution of this paper is to point out that the relationship
between frequency choices and distance depends crucially on the presence of personal trans-
2Additionally, unlike the US airline industry, European airline markets have been relatively under-
researched (due predominantly to the lack of su¢ cient data). Notable empirical studies of the European
commercial aviation industry include Carlsson (2004), Fageda (2006), Marín (1995), Neven et al. (2006) and
Schipper et al. (2002).
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portation, a nding identied theoretically and tested empirically for the European airline
industry. Thus, the distance between endpoints in city-pair markets constitutes a potentially
important factor to be considered when analyzing scheduled transportation services. The
logic of the model goes beyond the transportation sector since we could use a similar setup
to analyze the behavior of a rm in situations in which its potential customers face an al-
ternative which in certain dimensions is ex-ante better than what the rm can o¤er versus
cases where such an alternative is absent.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the equilibrium and
compares the equilibrium outcome with the social optimum. An empirical application to the
European airline market is provided in Section 3 and a brief conclusion closes the paper. All
the proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 The model
Our model is based on indirect utilities of heterogeneous travelers choosing between sched-
uled services and personal transport. We consider an air carrier as the provider of scheduled
services, for the purpose of exposition, but other modes of transportation (in particular, the
high-speed train) can easily t into our framework.
The model combines elements of Brueckners (2004) monopoly scheduling model along
with a di¤erentiation of consumers by their value of time similar to the one suggested
in Bilotkach (2006). In the model, utility for a consumer traveling by air is given by
Consumption   Schedule delay disutility + V alue of available time.
Consumption is y   pair where y is the common level of income and pair is the airlines
fare.
Letting H denote the time circumference of the circle, consumer utility then depends on
expected schedule delay (dened as the di¤erence between the preferred and actual departure
times) which equals H=4f , where f is number of (evenly spaced) ights operated by the
airline. The Schedule delay disutility is equal to a disutility parameter  > 0 times the
expected schedule delay expression from above, thus equaling H=4f = =f , where   H=4.
Finally, the available time at the destination is computed as the di¤erence between pas-
sengers total trip time (T ) and the actual traveling time which depends on the distance
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between the origin and the destination (d) and the planes speed (V ), thus equaling T  d=V .
We assume a large enough T so that T > d=V . Thus, taking into account the travelers
specic value of time , the V alue of available time at the destination equals  (T   d=V ),
where  is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the range [0; 1]. Hence, utility from air
travel is uair = y   pair   =f +  [T   d=V ].
However, consumers can also make use of an alternative surface transport mode (i.e., car)
obtaining a utility of Consumption + V alue of available time since there is no schedule
delay in this case. Therefore utility from driving is ucar = y cd+ [T   d= (V )], where cd is
the cost of the trip that increases with distance,  captures the airline/car speed di¤erential
and  2 (0; 1=2), i.e., we assume that traveling by car is at least twice as slow as air travel,
and T is large enough so that T > d= (V ).3
Additionally, we allow for partially-served markets because consumers can also choose
not to travel and stay at home, obtaining a utility of uo = y.
Observe that, since air travel is faster than travel by private vehicle, the uair   ucar
di¤erential is greater the higher the consumers value of time (). In other words, both uair
and ucar increase with , but uair is steeper than ucar. This basically ensures that the higher
a consumers value of time, the more likely she is to y rather than drive, other things being
equal.
Disregarding the trivial cases (either where nobody travels or where everyone uses the
same mode of transport), we can state the following: a consumer will undertake air travel
when uair > max fucar; uog. The inequality uair > ucar requires  > e with
e = (pair   cd+ =f)V
d(1  ) ; (1)
and the inequality uair > uo holds for  >  with
 =
pair + =f
T   d=V . (2)
Finally, a consumer will drive when ucar > max fuair; uog, where ucar > uair requires  < e
and ucar > uo requires  > b with
b = cd
T   d= (V ) . (3)
3Note that cars are much slower than new high-speed trains, which have been designed to reach a speed
above 250 km/h.
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Consumers with a su¢ ciently high value of time will undertake air travel and consumers
with a su¢ ciently low time value will stay at home. Consequently, we are left with two
possible scenarios depending on whether driving is a dominated alternative or not: the case
with drivers where 0 < b < e < 1 (Scenario 1); and the situation where there are no drivers
with 0 < e < b < 1 (Scenario 2). These two scenarios are represented in Figures 1 and 2
below.
 Insert here Figures 1 and 2 
As suggested before, we observe that uair is steeper than ucar because  2 (0; 1=2) and
thus, as  approaches 1, the airline carries more tra¢ c.
The case with drivers (Scenario 1) requires b < e and, from this inequality we obtain
pairV

+ cTV 2 + V
f

d TV 2

pair +

f

< cd2V . Then, it can be shown that this condition
requires d < d, so we conclude that Scenario 1 is only relevant for short distances, meaning
that driving is considered a viable alternative by some consumers only for su¢ ciently short-
haul trips. Lemma 1 below summarizes this result (a detailed proof is provided in Appendix
A).
Lemma 1 Given the indirect utilities specied above, there is a single cut-o¤ distance d
such that Scenario 1 (with drivers) is observed for d < d (short-haul city-pair markets);
while Scenario 2 (without drivers) emerges for d > d (long-haul city-pair markets).
Looking at our data for the European airline markets examined in the empirical applica-
tion in Section 3, this cut-o¤ distance d is evaluated at around 500 kilometers (311 miles).
For each of the two scenarios, the analysis that follows derives the demand functions,
species the airlines cost structure, and describes the prot functions. Afterwards, both the
equilibrium and the social optimum are analyzed in each scenario.
2.1 Scenario 1: driving is not a dominated alternative
Under Scenario 1, a traveler will y when  > e. Otherwise, the consumer will use private
transportation. Then, using (1), the airlines demand is given by
qair =
Z 1
e d = 1  e = 1  (pair   cd+ =f)Vd(1  ) . (4)
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To characterize the equilibrium in fares and frequencies,4 we need to specify the carriers
cost structure. A ights operating cost is given by  (d) + s where s stands for aircraft
size (i.e., the number of seats). The parameter  is the marginal cost per seat of serving
the passenger on the ground and in the air. Finally, the function  (d) stands for the cost of
frequency (or cost per departure) that captures the aircraft xed cost which includes landing
and navigation fees, renting gates, airport maintenance and the cost of fuel. We assume that
 (d) is continuously di¤erentiable with respect to d > 0 and that 0(d) > 0 because fuel
consumption increases with distance.
As in Brueckner (2004), it is assumed that all seats are lled, so that load factor equals
100% and therefore s = qair=f , i.e., aircraft size can be determined residually dividing the
airlines total tra¢ c on a route by the number of ights. Note that cost per seat, which can
be written  (d) =s+  , visibly decreases with s capturing the presence of economies of tra¢ c
density (i.e., economies from operating a larger aircraft holding the load factor constant)
which are unequivocal in the airline industry.5 In other words, having a larger tra¢ c density
on a certain route reduces the impact on the cost associated with higher frequency.
Therefore, the airlines total cost from operating on a route is f [ (d) + s] or equivalently
c =  (d) f + qair. (5)
Thus the airlines prot is air = pairqair   c, which can be rewritten using (5) as
air = (pair   ) qair   (d)f , (6)
indicating that average variable costs are independent of the number of ights.
After plugging (4) into (6) and maximizing, the rst-order condition for the fare is @air
@pair
=
1  V
d(1 ) (2pair   cd+ =f   ) = 0 and, from this condition, it is easy to obtain the following
expression
pair =
1
2

cd+    =f + d(1  )
V

, (7)
4On the other hand, a traveler will prefer to drive instead of stay at home (i.e., not travel at all) for
 > b; and thus, qcar = R eb d = e   b and qo = R b0 d = b. The demand for the three possible consumer
options is determined by the choices made by the airline. However, the focus of the paper is the airlines
frequency choice.
5Empirical studies conrming presence of economies of tra¢ c density in the airline industry include Caves
et al. (1984), Brueckner and Spiller (1994) and Berry et al. (1996).
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so that fares increase with variable costs and with distance, and they decrease with schedule
delay and with the speed of personal transportation (V ).
On the other hand, the rst-order condition for frequency is given by @air
@f
= (pair )V
d(1 )f2  
 (d) = 0 or equivalently by
f =

(pair   ) V
 (d) d (1  )
1=2
, (8)
indicating that frequency increases with passengersdisutility of delay, carriers margin (pair 
) and the speed of personal transportation, and decreases with the cost of frequency and
distance.
The second-order conditions @2air=@p2air; @
2air=@f
2 < 0 are satised by inspection and
the remaining positivity condition on the Hessian determinant is discussed below. By com-
bining the two rst-order conditions, we obtain the following equilibrium condition
2(d)d(1  )
V
f 3| {z }
Cf
=

cd   + d(1  )
V

f   | {z }
Lf
. (9)
The equilibrium frequency is shown graphically in Figure 3, as in Brueckner (2004) and
Brueckner and Flores-Fillol (2007), where we observe that the f solution occurs at an in-
tersection between a cubic expression (Cf ) and a linear expression (Lf ) whose vertical
intercept is negative. The slope of Lf  must be positive for the solution to be positive and
thus we assume that  is small enough for this to be the case. We observe that there are two
possible positive solutions, but only the second one satises the second-order condition.6
 Insert here Figure 3 
Looking at (9) together with Figure 3, we can carry out a comparative statics analysis for
all the parameters in the model. Although some e¤ects do not seem trivial from inspection of
(9), the lemma below ascertains the overall e¤ect by analyzing the sign of the total di¤erential
of the equilibrium frequency with respect to each parameter.
Lemma 2 In Scenario 1, the equilibrium frequency falls with an increase in the marginal
cost per seat (). Frequency also decreases with the speed of both plane (V ) and car () if
6Positivity of the Hessian determinant requires pair   > 4f . Observe that for the second intersection to
be relevant, the slope of Cf must exceed the slope of Lf, i.e., 6(d)d(1 )V f
2 > cd   + d(1 )V . Using the
rst-order conditions for pair and f , this expression reduces to pair    > 4f , which is exactly the condition
required by the positivity of the Hessian determinant.
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 > cd. However, it rises with the disutility of delay () and the cost of driving (c).
Looking at the e¤ect of distance on the equilibrium ight frequency, although the e¤ect is in
general indeterminate, we observe that df

dd
> 0 can hold at least for su¢ ciently low distances.
As expected, there is a positive relationship between  and f  since carriers increase
frequency as passengers disutility of delay increases. When the cost of driving (c) rises,
the equilibrium frequency also increases because the car becomes a worse option and more
passengers choose air travel. When the marginal cost per seat () increases, frequency falls
since air travel becomes a less competitive option.
Note that  is the airline/car speed di¤erential and that when  increases the cars speed
increases relative to that of the airplane, and driving becomes a more attractive option for
travel (for  > cd, so that the cost per seat is higher than the cost of driving). Thus, more
passengers prefer personal transportation and ight frequency falls. Finally, the e¤ect of
planes speed (V ) seems to be somewhat counterintuitive since frequency falls when V rises
(again for  > cd). Yet, higher speed of the aircraft means that the traveler reaches her nal
destination faster, compensating for the disutility of schedule delay.
Looking at the e¤ect of distance on equilibrium frequency, our result suggests that the
airline may choose to increase the frequency of service as distance increases. This result ap-
pears counterintuitive at rst. Indeed, with longer distance driving becomes a less attractive
substitute for ying, as the ratio of remaining time for the driver to remaining time for the
yer T d=(V )
T d=V shrinks with distance. Then, as distance increases, the airline will have less
incentive to increase the quality of its product, and can simply charge the customers more as
demand grows by itself. In fact, the rst-order condition for f (see (8)) tells us exactly that:
with higher distance, other things being equal, our carrier can a¤ord to reduce the frequency
(and save money). Thus, distance has a negative direct e¤ect on frequency.
The answer to this puzzle lies in the rst-order condition for pair which shows a positive
indirect e¤ect of distance on frequency through fares (see (7)) since pair(d
+
) and f(pair
+
). The
lemma above suggests that the indirect e¤ect may prevail.
Air travel is perceived as a better option than driving as distance increases because it is
faster and reduces travel time and, as a consequence, our monopolist carrier faces a higher
demand as distance increases. Since there is a positive relationship between pair and f , when
facing a higher demand (as distance increases) our monopolist can boost prots by increasing
ight frequency. Thus, in addition to the marginal cost associated with higher frequency,
the airline can obtain the marginal benet in terms of the higher price it will be able to
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charge (in addition to the price increase due to longer distance already present in (7)). What
Lemma 2 says, then, is that the airline will increase its service quality (frequency) when the
marginal benet from doing so outweighs the marginal cost; moreover, the set of parameter
values where this will happen will be non-empty.
2.2 Scenario 2: driving is a dominated alternative
The case without drivers is not nearly as exciting: we observe the empirically conrmed
decreasing relationship between frequency and distance.
Under Scenario 2, a traveler will y when  >  and stay home otherwise. From (2),
demand for air travel is given by
qair =
Z 1

d = 1   = 1  pair + =f
T   d=V , (10)
and costs and prots are as in Scenario 1 (see (5) and (6)). After plugging (10) into
the prot function and maximizing, the rst-order condition for the fare is @air
@pair
= 1  
1
T d=V (2pair + =f   ) = 0 and, from this condition, we obtain
pair =
1
2
(T   =f   d=V + ) , (11)
which shows that fares rise with passengerstotal time, variable costs and aircrafts speed,
and fall with schedule delay and distance. Comparing (7) and (11), we observe that pair
increases with distance in Scenario 1, but the sign of this e¤ect changes in Scenario 2. This
is explained by the di¤erent kinds of competition existing in the two scenarios. On the one
hand, when competing against driving, ying becomes more attractive as distance increases
and thus the airline can increase fares. On the other hand, when competing against staying at
home, ying becomes less attractive for longer distances and the airline tries to compensate
this negative e¤ect by lowering fares.
The rst-order condition for frequency is given by @air
@f
= (pair )
(T d=V )f2   (d) = 0 or equiv-
alently by
f =

(pair   )V
(d)(TV   d)
1=2
, (12)
showing that frequency increases with passengersdisutility of delay, carriers margin (pair )
and airlines speed, whereas it decreases with passengerstotal time and the cost of frequency.
Di¤erently from Scenario 1, the e¤ect of distance on f is unclear.
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By combining the two rst-order conditions, we obtain the following equilibrium condition
2(d)(TV   d)

f 3| {z }
Cf
= (TV   d  V ) f   V| {z }
Lf
. (13)
As in Scenario 1, the f solution occurs at an intersection of Cf  and Lf  whose vertical
intercept is negative. It is su¢ cient to assume a large T to have a positive sloping Lf  so that
there are positive values for f . As in Scenario 1, there are two possible positive solutions,
but only the second one satises the second-order condition.7
The comparative statics e¤ects are summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 3 In Scenario 2, equilibrium ight frequency falls with an increase in the marginal
cost per seat (). However, frequency rises with the disutility of delay (), the planes speed
(V ) and passengerstotal time (T ).
Finally, looking at the e¤ect of distance, we observe that df

dd
< 0, i.e., equilibrium ight
frequency decreases with distance.
As under Scenario 1, we observe f (
+
) and f (
 
). When passengerstotal time (T ) rises,
more passengers are willing to undertake air travel since the utility of ying increases and, as
a consequence, the equilibrium frequency increases. Finally, when the planes speed increases
(V ), we observe the same e¤ect as with T , i.e., the valuation of air travel increases and thus
the equilibrium frequency rises.
Looking at the e¤ect of distance, from the rst-order conditions we observe that the direct
e¤ect on frequency is unclear (see (12)) and there is a negative indirect e¤ect through fares
(see (11)) since pair(d 
) and f(pair
+
). The above lemma states that the indirect e¤ect outweighs
the direct one.
Combining the results from Lemmas 1-3, we deduce that the equilibrium frequency can
increase with distance when driving is not a dominated option (i.e., Scenario 1), whereas
it decreases with distance when driving is disregarded by consumers as a relevant mode of
transport (i.e., Scenario 2), as stated in the proposition that follows.
7The second-order conditions @2air=@p2air; @
2air=@f
2 < 0 are satised by inspection and the remaining
positivity condition on the Hessian determinant is the same as in Scenario 1, i.e., pair    > 4f . Again as
in Scenario 1, for the second intersection to be relevant, the slope of Cf must exceed the slope of Lf; and
this condition exactly reduces to pair    > 4f .
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Proposition 1 From Lemmas 1-3 we conclude that equilibrium frequency
i) may increase with distance for d < d;
ii) decreases with distance for d > d.
Hence, when driving is a dominated alternative (i.e., d > d), ight frequency decreases
with distance, conrming the results in Wei and Hansen (2006) and Pai (2007). More inter-
estingly, when driving is not a dominated alternative (i.e., d < d), air travel is perceived
as a better option than driving as distance increases because it is faster and reduces travel
time. Then airlines increase service quality with distance by o¤ering higher frequency at a
higher fare.
As we suggested above, our result is due to a trade-o¤ between two forces. On the one
hand, increasing frequency always implies an extra cost for the provider of scheduled trans-
portation services in terms of higher xed costs and lower benets from density economies
which, in the case of airlines, arise from using bigger aircraft at high load factors. On the
other hand, an increase in distance may boost the demand for high-speed scheduled trans-
portation services on short-haul routes where the use of private vehicles is a relevant option
for travelers. This is because an increase in distance makes the high-speed transportation
mode more competitive and so providers of scheduled transportation services are able to
increase frequency and charge higher fares. Thus, the relationship between frequency choices
and distance depends crucially on the presence of personal transportation.
2.3 The social optimum
Having analyzed the monopoly airlines choice, our attention now shifts to welfare analysis
in which a social planner decides ight frequency and tra¢ c so as to maximize social surplus,
which is computed as the sum of total utility and airline prot. We need to di¤erentiate
between the two scenarios.
Scenario 1: driving is not a dominated alternative
Total utility for passengers undertaking air travel is uair =
Z 1

[y   pair   =f +  (T   d=V )] d,
where  denotes the air-travel/driving margin. Therefore, carrying out the integration we
obtain
uair = (y   pair   =f) (1  ) + T   d=V
2
 
1  2 . (14)
Total utility for driving passengers is ucar =
Z 

[y   cd+  (T   d= (V ))] d, where
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 denotes the driving/staying margin. Integrating across drivers we obtain
ucar = (y   cd) (   ) + T   d= (V )
2
 
2   2 . (15)
Finally, total utility for "stayers" is
uo =
Z 
0
yd = y. (16)
From (6), airlines total prot equals air = (pair   )
Z 1

d (d)f and after integrating
across yers it becomes
air = (pair   ) (1  )  (d)f . (17)
The total welfare function is computed by adding utilities and prots, i.e., W = uair +
ucar + uo + air.8 This expression, after substituting (14), (15), (16) and (17), becomes
W = y (=f + ) (1  ) (d)f+T   d=V
2
 
1  2+T   d= (V )
2
 
2   2 cd (   ) .
(18)
The planner chooses  and , which determine the optimal air and road tra¢ c, along
with ight frequencies to maximize (18). Observe that airfares do not appear in the expres-
sion because they are transfers between airlines and air travelers.
From the rst-order condition for frequency we obtain
f 2 =
 (1  )
(d)
, (19)
which indicates that the optimal frequency increases with the disutility of delay and with the
proportion of air travelers, whereas it decreases with the cost of frequency.
8This analysis implicitly assumes that the "gasoline market" is perfectly competitive. If the "gasoline
market" is either imperfectly competitive or regulated so that the price is kept above cost, then (at least
part of) the cost drivers incur is somebodys prot. In the case in which all the cost of driving represents
the prot of "gasoline companies" (i.e., car = cd
Z 

d), the welfare function that the social planner is
to maximize has to incorporate this new element, so that it becomes W = uair + ucar + uo + air + car.
In fact, taking into account a positive prot for "gasoline rms" makes driving a better travel option from
the viewpoint of the social planner. In this framework, the socially desired number of yers and "stayers"
decreases, the number of drivers increases, and equilibrium frequency can be both suboptimal or excessive
depending on the value of cd. More information on this particular case is available from the authors upon
request.
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The rst-order condition for choice of  yields
 =
(   cd+ =f)V
d (1  )  eso, (20)
and, by comparing (1) with (20) it is easy to check that e > eso since pair >  (because
otherwise the airline would have negative prots). Therefore, air tra¢ c is suboptimal and
there are too many drivers in equilibrium.
The rst-order condition for choice of  yields
 =
cd
T   d= (V )  bso, (21)
so that b = bso and thus the amount of "stayers" is socially optimal.
 Insert here Figure 4 
From (19) and (20), we obtain the following expression
(d)d(1  )
V
f 3| {z }
CfSO
=

cd   + d(1  )
V

f   | {z }
Lf=LfSO
. (22)
The social optimum and equilibrium are easily compared because the RHS is identical
and the only di¤erence in the LHS is the absence of the 2 factor multiplying the expression.
As a result, the socially optimal ight frequency is higher than the equilibrium frequency, as
show in the gure below
 Insert here Figure 5 
The results are summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 4 Under Scenario 1, both the equilibrium ight frequency and air tra¢ c are subop-
timal (i.e., f  < fSO and eso < e).
Therefore, in the eyes of the social planner, more drivers should undertake air travel.
To achieve this, the airline should increase ight frequency. This result is consistent with
those in Brueckner (2004), Brueckner and Flores-Fillol (2007) and Flores-Fillol (2008). As
pointed out in Flores-Fillol (2008), the underprovision of frequency is the natural result in
monopolistic situations and even under competition when carriers operate point-to-point
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networks.9
Scenario 2: driving is a dominated alternative
Proceeding in a similar way as in Scenario 1, we have uair = (y   pair   =f) (1  ) +
T d=V
2
(1  2), uo = y and air = (pair   ) (1  )   (d)f where  now denotes the
air-travel/driving margin. Computing W = uair + uo + air, we obtain
W = y   (=f + ) (1  )  (d)f + T   d=V
2
 
1  2 . (23)
From the planners rst-order conditions for f and , we obtain f 2 = (1 
)
(d)
which is
the same condition as in Scenario 1 (see (19)); and
 =
 + =f
T   d=V  so, (24)
and, by comparing (2) with (24) it is easy to check that so <  since pair >  . Therefore, air
tra¢ c is again suboptimal. Finally, from (19) and (24), we obtain the following expression
(d)(TV   d)

f 3| {z }
CfSO
= (TV   d  V ) f   V| {z }
Lf=LfSO
. (25)
As in Scenario 1, the social optimum and equilibrium are easily compared because the
RHS is identical and the only di¤erence in the LHS is the absence of the 2 factor multiplying
the expression. As a result, there is also an underprovision of ight frequency in absence of
drivers as summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 5 Under Scenario 2, both the equilibrium ight frequency and air tra¢ c are subop-
timal (i.e., f  < fSO and so < ).
Hence, the number of "stayers" is no longer e¢ cient in Scenario 2, since some of them
should undertake air travel to achieve the social optimum. To carry the extra passengers
needed to obtain e¢ ciency, our carrier should increase frequency, as in Scenario 1.
To sum up, the social optimum analysis performed under the two scenarios considered
suggests that higher ight frequency should be provided by the carrier so that more passengers
make use of air travel.
9Flores-Fillol (2008) claims that the apparent overprovison of ight frequency in the current unregulated
context, requires us to consider airline competition where carriers operate in hub-and-spoke networks and
markets are partially served.
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3 Empirical application
This section o¤ers an empirical test of the models predictions, using the data on frequency
choices by airlines in the deregulated EU market. Specically, we use airline-route-level fre-
quencies on European routes over the period from May 2006 until April 2007.10 Our sample
includes routes from the ten largest airports in Europe to all European destinations (EU27 +
Switzerland and Norway) with direct ights. Data of airline frequencies have been provided
by O¢ cial Airlines Guide (OAG Data market analysis publication). We exclude observations
for airlines that o¤er fewer than 52 frequencies per year on a particular route: operations
with less than one ight per week should not be considered as scheduled.
Our theoretical model predicts the possibility of increasing frequency with length of haul
for routes on which potential customers may consider driving as a viable alternative to ying.
Figure 6 shows the spline that estimates the relationship between distance and frequency in
our dataset without imposing any restriction or shape in the functional form of this relation-
ship.
 Insert here Figure 6 
Results of the spline suggest that the frequency-distance relationship changes at a haul
length of about 500 kilometers (311miles). Specically, this gure suggests a higher frequency
on longer routes for distances less than 500 kilometers; the direction of the relationship is
reversed for routes longer than 500 kilometers (note that, for the sake of clarity, we depict
the spline only for distances less than 1; 000 kilometers). However, since Figure 6 presents a
rough picture, we must control for several route features and airline specic factors to come
to a denite conclusion.
An obvious but important feature of the theoretical model is that there is a positive
relationship between ight frequency and demand for air services. The empirical application
is based on examining determinants of airlinesfrequency choices. Thus, to be consistent with
our theoretical model, we have to include distance together with the usual regional variables
(population, income, etc.) as explanatory variables to capture relevant air demand shifters
at the route level.
10We dene routes as air services between two di¤erent airports, so that one city-pair market (e.g., London-
Milan) may include several routes.
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Lemmas 2 and 3 in the theoretical model state that frequency decreases with the air-
line/car speed di¤erential (), while it increases with the disutility of delay (). We also
observe that distance is a relevant measure of the possible advantage of airlines with respect
to cars, but it is not the only one: availability and quality of surface road network will also
play a major role. In our empirical specications, we use an indicator for the absence of
direct roadways between the endpoints (i.e., cases in which at least one of the cities is lo-
cated on an island) as a crude measure of car/plane substitutability beyond simple distance.
Thus, distance and island endpoints explain, to a large extent, aircraft speed advantage in
comparison with other transportation modes. In the same way, the disutility of delay should
be more important on short-haul routes in which personal transportation is a relevant option
(i.e., driving is not a dominated alternative).
Additionally, the theoretical model also predicts a negative relationship between frequency
and the marginal cost per seat (); and in the empirical application we include some airline
attributes (i.e., airport presence, exploitation of connecting tra¢ c) that may inuence the
marginal cost per seat of carriers or, alternatively, their marginal revenue given the marginal
cost per seat (Borenstein, 1989; Berry et al., 1996).
Beyond the theoretical model, the intensity of airline competition is also taken into ac-
count as an explanatory variable since, other things being equal, the specic demand for an
airline is inuenced both by service quality of other airlines operating on the same route
and of surface transportation modes. Note that our theoretical model considers a monopoly
provider of scheduled transportation services, while our empirical analysis uses a sample of
routes with di¤erent market structures. However, a large proportion of the routes in our sam-
ple have a high level of concentration. In fact, 54% of routes are monopoly routes and the
concentration index (HHI) is higher than 0:80 in an additional 6% of routes, so the monopoly
seems to be the best-tting market structure for about 60% of the routes included in our
sample.
Eventually, the following equation will be estimated:
Frequencyijk = + 1Distanceij + 2Populationij + 3GDPCij + 4D
capital
ij + 5D
island
j +
6Tourismj + 7HHIij + 8D
LCC
k + 9D
interhub
k + 10Airport-presencek + "ijk,
(26)
where the dependent variable is annual frequencies of airline k from airport i to airport j
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(Frequencyijk). We consider the following variables as exogenous explanatory variables of
airlinesfrequency choices:11
1. Populationij: Weighted average of population at the origin and destination regions of
the route (NUTS 2 level). Airline frequencies should be higher on routes that link more
populated regions due to higher demand for air travel.
2. GDPCij: Weighted average of Gross Domestic Product per capita at the origin and
destination regions of the route (NUTS 2 level). Weights are based on population.
Airline frequencies should be higher on routes that link richer regions due to higher
demand for air travel.
3. Dcapitalij : Dummy variable that takes value 1 when one of the route endpoints is located
in the political capital of the corresponding country. Employees of public administra-
tions may require air services to carry out their professional duties.
4. Dislandj : Dummy variable that takes value 1 when at least one of the endpoints is located
on an island. On islands, alternative transport modes (ships) are poorer substitutes to
airline services than surface transport modes (cars, trains) on the mainland. Therefore,
demand for air services should be higher when one of the endpoints of the route is an
island.
5. Tourismj: Percentage of employment in hotels and restaurants in the destination region
of the route (NUTS 2 level). Airline frequencies should be higher on routes where the
destination has signicant tourist activity due to the higher demand for air services.
6. HHIij: Herndahl-Hirschman index in terms of airline frequencies at the route level.
Since airlines compete in fares and frequencies, they should increase frequencies when
competition from other carriers is tougher.
7. DLCCk : Dummy variable that takes value 1 for low-cost carriers. We dene as low-cost
carriers those airlines that do not use a business fare class on any route and have only
economy class cabins. At least in Europe, the route network of low-cost carriers is based
on point-to-point services. Therefore, their frequencies should be lower than those of
other airlines that may be operating hub-and-spoke networks.
11Data for population, GDP and tourism specialization at the NUTS 2 level (the statistical unit used by
Eurostat) have been provided by Cambridge Econometrics (European Regional Database publication).
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8. Dinterhubk : Dummy variable that takes value 1 for hubbing airlines that use the origin
airport as the spoke of its hub (e.g., Lufthansas ights to Frankfurt). These airlines
should have a high number of frequencies to feed their hubs.
9. Airport-presencek: Given the importance of this element, we use two variables to dene
the presence of the airline at the origin airport. First, the total number of destinations
served by the airline from the origin airport (Destinationk). Second, the market share
of the airline in terms of total departures from the origin airport (Airportsharek).
These variables are highly correlated so they should be estimated separately to avoid
multicollinearity. Our baseline specication includes Destinationk as explanatory vari-
able, but the results are very similar regardless of the indicator of airport presence used.
Note that the frequency that an airline sets at the route level should be high when its
presence in the origin airport is strong. Airport dominance allows an airline to have
control of the slots and facilities at the terminal building (gates, check-in counters, etc.)
that are needed to o¤er high frequencies. This has been well documented in the liter-
ature since the seminal work of Borenstein (1989). In addition to this, a high amount
of operations in a large airport by an airline usually indicates the use of that airport
to exploit connecting tra¢ c (in our sample, the only exception is Easyjet at Gatwick).
Our empirical strategy involves estimating equation (26) for routes with less and more
than 500 kilometers. This will allow us to examine the relationship between frequencies
and distances depending on whether driving is a dominated alternative or not. One may
be tempted to suggest a regression over the entire sample with a dummy variable indicating
routes shorter than 500 kilometers. However, our hypothesis does not really tell us what the
sign of this variable should be. Rather, it just says that the slope of the frequency-distance
relationship is positive up to 500 kilometers and negative afterwards, a conclusion that does
not say how average frequencies in the two ranges compare.12
Note that the dummy variable for islands may distort the results with regard to our main
hypothesis. Indeed, driving may not be a viable option even on short-haul routes when one
of the endpoints is an island. Furthermore, the variable for islands may also distort results
12In any case, it is interesting to mention results of estimating equation (26) for the entire sample including
the dummy variable for routes shorter than 500 kilometers. This dummy variable takes a positive value and
is clearly signicant from a statistical point of view. Thus, airline frequency seems to be higher for short-haul
routes. The results of this estimation are available from the authors upon request.
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of the variable for tourism since tourist activity on islands tends to be signicant. Hence, we
estimate equation (26) for all routes within the corresponding distance range (less or more
than 500 kilometers), and then compute the estimation excluding routes that have an island
as an endpoint (origin and/or destination) as well. In this latter estimation, we exclude
ights from London-Heathrow and London-Gatwick to the continent. We also exclude ights
that have any island as destination.
Table 1 includes some characteristics of origin airports included in our dataset (ten largest
European gateways in terms of total passenger tra¢ c). Our sample includes a total of 887
routes. Some di¤erences across airports should be noted. Amsterdam and Barcelona serve the
most European destinations, and London-Heathrow and Paris-Orly the fewest. Note that the
three largest airports in terms of total tra¢ c (London-Heathrow, Paris-CDG and Frankfurt)
do not necessarily have the highest amount of frequencies to European destinations. Capacity
constraints may explain the fact that low-cost carriers do not operate in London-Heathrow,
but have a signicant share in airports like Barcelona, Amsterdam, Paris-Orly and especially
London-Gatwick. For the rest of airports, the role of low-cost carriers is modest. The position
of the dominant airline seems to be especially strong in the case of Air France (Paris-CDG,
Paris-Orly) and Lufthansa (Frankfurt, Munich) although the dominant airline also controls
about half of total operations in the rest of airports. In all the cases, the average number of
route competitors is lower than 3 and it is lower than 2 in London airports, Paris-Orly and
Amsterdam. Average route distance is about 1; 000 kilometers, a gure that varies depending
on the geographical location of each airport (except in London-Gatwick which is very high).
Table 2 shows some preliminary evidence of airline choices concerning frequencies and
aircraft size as a function of route distance. For all airlines in our sample, frequencies are
substantially higher on short-haul routes than on long-haul ones. Di¤erences in average
frequencies between short-haul and long-haul routes are statistically signicant when consid-
ering all airlines, hubbing airlines at the origin airport, and low-cost carriers. In contrast,
planes are bigger on long-haul routes although di¤erences from a statistical point of view are
modest. Low-cost airlines are the exception, as they typically use the same type of aircraft
on most of their routes. The analysis must take into account other variables that inuence
airline choices, but it seems that airlines are required to o¤er high frequencies on short-haul
routes. In contrast, they may exploit density economies on long-haul routes from the use of
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bigger planes at high load factors.13
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the continuous and discrete variables used in the
empirical analysis. All variables have enough variability to capture relevant di¤erences across
the routes of the airlines in our sample. Table 4 shows results from estimates of equation
(26) for routes of less than 500 kilometers, while Table 5 presents the results for routes of
more than 500 kilometers.
We estimate our equation using both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Zero Truncated
Poisson (ZTP) techniques. The latter technique allows us to exploit the form of the de-
pendent variable which takes positive integer values. However, since the number of counts
is high, we do not expect substantial di¤erences in our results when using either OLS or
ZTP. The overall explanatory power of the models estimated is reasonably good. Results are
similar when using OLS or ZTP techniques, and the variation ination factors (VIF) show
that multicollinearity is absent in our regressions. Di¤erent specications are estimated with
the ZTP technique. Specication (2) is the baseline, specication (3) uses Airportsharek as
indicator of airport presence and specication (4) excludes routes with islands as endpoints.
Finally, specication (5) uses the same sample of routes as in specication (4), but it also
includes as explanatory variable a dummy variable that captures the presence of high-speed
train services, as explained below.
As regards ight frequency and distance, we nd a positive relationship between airline
frequencies and distance for routes shorter than 500 kilometers. This relationship is statisti-
cally signicant at the 5 percent level when including routes with islands as endpoints, and is
statistically signicant at the 1 percent level when excluding routes with islands as endpoints.
In terms of elasticities, a 10 percent increase in route distance implies an increase of about
4 percent in airline frequency. Interestingly, 4 percent of the average frequency for routes
with less than 500 kilometers amounts to 59 ights, meaning that a 10 percent increase in
distance adds about a ight per week, other things being equal.
For routes longer than 500 kilometers, we nd a negative relationship between airline
frequencies and distance. This relationship is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level.
Focusing on elasticities, a 10 percent increase in route distance implies a decrease of about 5
13Note also that aircraft costs correspond to three stages: takeo¤, inight time and landing. With regard
to the size of the aircraft scale diseconomies arise in takeo¤ and landing, while scale economies arise at the
cruise speed. This explains why aircraft that minimize costs are smaller on short-haul than on long-haul
routes.
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percent in airline frequency. Note that 5 percent of the average frequency for routes longer
than 500 kilometers is only 38 extra ights per year. So, while the sensitivity of frequency
to distance appears similar (though the direction of the e¤ect is di¤erent) for shorter and
longer routes, in absolute value the e¤ect is bigger for short-haul markets.
Thus, we provide empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis stated in our theoretical
framework. On the one hand, airline frequency decreases with distance on long-haul routes.
From our empirical analysis, this seems to be the case on routes longer than 500 kilometers.
On the other hand, on short-haul routes (routes shorter than 500 kilometers), airline fre-
quency increases with route distance.
Looking at demand shifters at the route level, population has a positive inuence on
airline frequency, as expected, although its statistical signicance is modest in some of the
specications estimated. The role of the city as a political capital has a political inuence
on airline frequencies but is only statistically signicant on short-haul routes that include a
higher proportion of domestic links.
The dummy variable for islands as endpoints has a positive inuence on airline frequen-
cies (as expected) but it is not statistically signicant. Moreover, tourism specialization
at the destination has a positive inuence on airline frequencies for short-haul routes when
routes that have an island as endpoint are excluded. Interestingly, Gross Domestic Product
per capita has a statistically signicant positive inuence on airline frequencies on long-haul
routes but is not a relevant factor on short-haul routes. The variable for intensity of com-
petition is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level in all the specications. Airline
frequencies decrease with the level of route concentration. As expected, airlines compete
strongly in frequencies, so the monopolization of a route allows an airline to operate fewer
ights.
Concerning airline attributes, the two di¤erent variables used to capture presence at the
origin airport have a positive sign and are statistically signicant at the 1 percent level in all
the specications. The results for the rest of variables do not change substantially when using
one or the other measure of airport presence, so that we present results for specications (1),
(2), (4), and (5) for short-haul routes when using the variable Destinationk as the indicator
of airport presence (recall that specication (3) uses Airportsharek as indicator of airport
presence).
The dummy variable for airlines that use the origin airport as spoke is also clearly signif-
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icant in all specications. Finally, the dummy variable for low-cost carriers is negative and
is statistically signicant in most of the specications.
The results of variables for intensity of competition and airline attributes are consistent
with those obtained by Carlsson (2004). Indeed, this study analyzes the e¤ect of market
structure on ight frequency for a sample of European city-pair markets, nding that former
ag carriers provide more ights than other airlines; and that market concentration has a
negative inuence on ight frequency. In this vein, Schipper et al. (2002) nd that bilateral
airline liberalization in Europe led to a higher frequency in city-pair markets for the period
1988-1992.
Note that some air routes in our sample are also a¤ected by competition from high-
speed trains. This is particularly the case for routes that have Paris as origin airport. The
interaction between air services and high-speed trains is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, this interaction is fully consistent with the empirical predictions of our theoretical
model. High-speed trains barely inuence airline behavior on long-haul routes but, on shorter
routes, airlines are required to provide higher quality products to prevent travelers from using
other transport modes (i.e., cars and trains on certain routes).
Specication (5) in Table 4 includes as an explanatory factor a dummy variable (de-
noted by DHSTij ) that takes value 1 for routes on which airlines compete with high-speed
train services.14 Following the denition used by the International Union of Railways (Union
Internationale des Chemins de Fer - UIC), we consider high-speed train lines to be those
lines with trains able to reach a speed above 250 km/h. This dummy variable takes a pos-
itive value but is not statistically signicant. This result does not mean that airlines and
high-speed trains do not compete: it is explained by the fact that airlines are required to
o¤er high frequencies on short-haul routes to be competitive against surface transportation
modes (either cars or trains). In addition to this, it is worth noting that airlines react to new
high-speed services by adjusting aircraft size and maintaining ight frequency. For example,
the reaction of Iberia to the new high-speed train service on the route Madrid-Barcelona
(the densest route in our sample) was to reduce aircraft size but maintain high frequencies.
Moreover, an accurate analysis of competition between airplanes and trains should take into
account the situation before and after the start of high-speed train services since these new
14Note that we do not estimate the specication (5), which includes the variable for high-speed train
services, when considering routes longer than 500 kilometers. In our dataset, a very few number of long-haul
routes have available high-speed train services.
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services typically cause a reduction in the number of airlines o¤ering services on the route.
To sum up, we have shown the same result both theoretically and empirically: airline
frequency choices are dependent upon competition from private vehicles. Airlines always
incur extra costs when adding ights on a route since economies of tra¢ c density require the
use of big aircraft at high load factors and each additional ight is associated with additional
xed costs. However, the demand for air services rises with distance on routes where airlines
compete with personal transportation since the latter is a slower transportation mode and,
in this case, airlines can increase frequency and charge higher fares as they become more
competitive.
In this regard, our empirical analysis shows that airlines increase frequency as distance
increases on routes shorter than 500 kilometers. Nevertheless, for routes longer than 500
kilometers, on which driving is a dominated alternative, airlines decrease frequency as dis-
tance increases. In the latter scenario, the demand for air services may not increase when the
origin and destination airports are more remote because some potential travelers may prefer
to stay at home, and airlines prefer to save costs by exploiting density economies.
4 Concluding remarks
The main contribution of this paper is to underscore that presence of the personal trans-
portation option crucially a¤ects frequency choice by a provider of scheduled transportation
services. We have shown this to be true, using distance as a proxy for the substitutability
between higher-speed scheduled services and private vehicles; our ndings are identied theo-
retically and tested empirically for the European airline industry. Analysts and policy-makers
should consider this factor when analyzing investment in transportation infrastructures and
regulation of scheduled services.
A large proportion of air tra¢ c involves short-haul routes where airlines must provide
high ight frequency to compete with cars. Our social optimum analysis shows that there
is an underprovision of ight frequency supposing that airports are not congested, implying
an overuse of personal transportation that may create problems such as pollution, noise and
road congestion.
Investing in road infrastructures may place strong pressure on public budgets. In fact,
the US Department of Transportation predicts a required expenditure of $225 billion (which
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represents over 1:5% of the current US GDP) annually for the next 50 years to upgrade the
existing road network. In this vein, a major goal in the transportation policy of the European
Commission is to alleviate road congestion by promoting the use of scheduled transportation
services.15 Since road and airport infrastructures are communicating vessels, we suggest that
policy makers could take into account capacity at national airports as an instrument avail-
able to reduce road congestion. Similarly, high-speed train lines providing a high frequency
of service may also be useful in alleviating road congestion.
While our empirical application relates to the airline industry (a competitive industry for
which relevant data are readily available), our analysis has policy implications for any trans-
port market with private transportation and scheduled services like inter-city and intra-city
surface transportation. Furthermore, the logic of the model goes beyond the transportation
sector since a similar setup could be used to analyze the behavior of a rm in situations
where better alternatives in certain dimensions are either present or absent. When these
alternatives are present, the rm may be required to nd other ways to improve its position
in the market even when this implies a higher cost; when they are absent, the main concern
of the rm will be related to the customers using its services.
A natural extension of our theoretical model would be to introduce competition across
scheduled carriers to capture the interaction among airlines. Additionally, the emerging
intermodal competition in Europe between airlines and high-speed trains should be examined
thoroughly. Although the dummy variable capturing the competition from high-speed trains
is not statistically signicant in our empirical application, this interaction needs further
analysis since airlines typically react to new high-speed services by adjusting aircraft size
and maintaining ight frequency.
15See the Report of the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission (2007),
and the White Paper "European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide" of the European Commission
(2001).
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Figure 2: Utilities in Scenario 2
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Figure 3: The f  solution
Figure 4: Suboptimal air tra¢ c
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
The case with drivers (Scenario 1) requires 0 < b < e < 1. From the inequality b < e
and after some computations we get:
pairV

+ cTV 2 +
V
f

d  TV 2

pair +

f

| {z }
Ld
< cd2V| {z }
Qd
, (A1)
that is represented in the Figure A1 below
Figure A1
Thus we conclude that b < e requires either d < d or d > d, where d and d are the
two roots solving the equation Ld = Qd. Although d and d can be computed, it is easier
to proceed in the following way. In the rst possible region (i.e., d < d), the slope of Qd
is smaller than the one of Ld and thus d <
1
 (pair+

f )+cTV
2c
and the opposite happens in the
second possible region (i.e., d > d). From e > 0 we know that d < pair+ f
c
and this condition
is incompatible with d >
1
 (pair+

f )+cTV
2c
(and thus with d > d) either for  < 1=2 (that is
assumed in the model) or for a large enough T . Therefore b < e requires d < d and thus
Scenario 1 (with drivers) is only relevant for short distances. 
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Proof of Lemma 2.
From (9), let us dene 
  Cf    Lf  = 0, that is

 =
2(d)d(1  )
V
f 3  

cd   + d(1  )
V

f +  = 0. (A2)
The total di¤erential of the equilibrium frequency with respect to a parameter x is df

dx
=
 @
=@x
@
=@f
. Notice that @
=@f = slope (Cf )   slope (Lf ) and thus @
=@f > 0 because at
the equilibrium frequency the slope of Cf  exceeds the slope of Lf . Thus we just need to
explore the sign of @
=@x.
 @
=@ =  2(d)d(1 )
2V
f 3 < 0. Then df

d
> 0. We observe that  " lowers the height of
the cubic curve Cf  in Figure 3 so that f  ".
 @
=@c =  df < 0. Then df
dc
> 0. We observe that c " increases the slope of Lf  in
Figure 3 so that f  ".
 @
=@ = f > 0. Then df
d
< 0. We observe that  " decreases the slope of Lf  in
Figure 3 so that f  #.
 @
=@V = 1
V

 2(d)d(1 )

f 3 + d(1 )
V
f

and, using (A2), this expression can be rewrit-
ten as @
=@V = 1 + (   cd) f=V . We observe that  > cd is a su¢ cient condition to
have @
=@V > 0 and thus df

dV
< 0.
 @
=@ = 1
V

 2(d)d(1 )

f 3 + d(1 )
V
f

, as in the latter case. Therefore the same su¢ -
cient condition ensures @
=@ > 0 and thus df

d
< 0.
@
=@d = 2
0(d)d(1 )
V
f 3 + 2(d)(1 )
V
f 3  

c+ 1 
V

f and, using (A2), this expression can
be rewritten as @
=@d = 2
0(d)d(1 )
V
f 3   +f
d
. Notice that when the cost of frequency is
independent of distance, i.e., 0 (d) = 0, @
=@d < 0 and df

dd
> 0. Yet, when 0 (d) > 0,
the result seems uncertain. Notice that 0 (d) is a continuous function starting from d = 0
because  (d) is continuously di¤erentiable with respect to d > 0. Therefore, at least for low
values of d we will observe @
=@d < 0 and df

dd
> 0. 
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Proof of Lemma 3.
From (13), let us dene 
  Cf    Lf  = 0, that is

 =
2(d)(TV   d)

f 3   (TV   d  V ) f + V = 0 (A3)
As before, the total di¤erential of the equilibrium frequency with respect to a parameter
x is df

dx
=  @
=@x
@
=@f
. Notice that @
=@f = slope (Cf )   slope (Lf ) and thus @
=@f > 0
because at the equilibrium frequency the slope of Cf  exceeds the slope of Lf . Thus we
just need to explore the sign of @
=@x.
 @
=@ =  2(d)(TV d)
2
f 3 < 0. Then df

d
> 0. We observe that  " lowers the height of
the cubic curve Cf  in Figure 3 so that f  ".
 @
=@ = V f > 0. Then df
d
< 0. We observe that  " decreases the slope of Lf  in
Figure 3 so that f  #.
 @
=@V = 2(d)T

f 3   Tf + f +  and, using (A3), this expression can be rewritten as
@
=@V = 2(d)

f 2   1, so that @
=@V < 0 requires f 2 < 
2(d)
. Then using (12) this
inequality becomes pair < 12 (T   d=V ) +  , and nally using (11) we obtain  =f < 
which is always true. Therefore, @
=@V < 0 and thus df

dV
> 0.
 @
=@T = 2(d)V

f 3   V f , so that @
=@T < 0 requires f 2 < 
2(d)
; and we just showed
this inequality always holds. Therefore @
=@T < 0 and thus df

dT
> 0.
 @
=@d = 20(d)(TV d)

f 3 + f   2(d)

f 3 and, plugging (A3) into the derivative we obtain
@
=@d = 2
0(d)(TV d)

f 3 + V+V f
TV d that is positive because T > d=V .
Therefore, df

dd
< 0 and thus frequency decreases with distance. 
38
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
 
 
2006 
 
 
CREAP2006-01 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J.Ll. (GEAP) 
"Economic development and changes in car ownership patterns"  
(Juny 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-02 
Trillas, F. (IEB); Montolio, D. (IEB); Duch, N. (IEB) 
"Productive efficiency and regulatory reform: The case of Vehicle Inspection Services"  
(Setembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-03 
Bel, G. (PPRE-IREA); Fageda, X. (PPRE-IREA) 
"Factors explaining local privatization: A meta-regression analysis"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-04 
Fernàndez-Villadangos, L. (PPRE-IREA) 
"Are two-part tariffs efficient when consumers plan ahead?: An empirical study"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-05 
Artís, M. (AQR-IREA); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA); Suriñach, J. (AQR-IREA) 
"Job losses, outsourcing and relocation: Empirical evidence using microdata"  
(Octubre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-06 
Alcañiz, M. (RISC-IREA); Costa, A.; Guillén, M. (RISC-IREA); Luna, C.; Rovira, C. 
"Calculation of the variance in surveys of the economic climate”  
(Novembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-07 
Albalate, D. (PPRE-IREA) 
"Lowering blood alcohol content levels to save lives: The European Experience”  
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-08 
Garrido, A. (IEB); Arqué, P. (IEB) 
“The choice of banking firm: Are the interest rate a significant criteria?”  
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
 
 
CREAP2006-09 
Segarra, A. (GRIT); Teruel-Carrizosa, M. (GRIT) 
"Productivity growth and competition in spanish manufacturing firms: 
What has happened in recent years?” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-10 
Andonova, V.; Díaz-Serrano, Luis. (CREB) 
"Political institutions and the development of telecommunications” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-11 
Raymond, J.L.(GEAP); Roig, J.L.. (GEAP) 
"Capital humano: un análisis comparativo Catalunya-España” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-12 
Rodríguez, M.(CREB); Stoyanova, A. (CREB) 
"Changes in the demand for private medical insurance following a shift in tax incentives” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-13 
Royuela, V. (AQR-IREA); Lambiri, D.; Biagi, B.  
"Economía urbana y calidad de vida. Una revisión del  estado del conocimiento en España” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-14 
Camarero, M.; Carrion-i-Silvestre, J.LL. (AQR-IREA).;Tamarit, C.  
"New evidence of the real interest rate parity for OECD countries using panel unit root tests with breaks” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
CREAP2006-15 
Karanassou, M.; Sala, H. (GEAP).;Snower , D. J.  
"The macroeconomics of the labor market: Three fundamental views” 
(Desembre 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
2007 
 
 
XREAP2007-01 
Castany, L (AQR-IREA); López-Bazo, E. (AQR-IREA).;Moreno , R. (AQR-IREA)  
"Decomposing differences in total factor productivity across firm size” 
(Març 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-02 
Raymond, J. Ll. (GEAP); Roig, J. Ll. (GEAP) 
“Una propuesta de evaluación de las externalidades de capital humano en la empresa" 
(Abril 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-03 
Durán, J. M. (IEB); Esteller, A. (IEB) 
“An empirical analysis of wealth taxation: Equity vs. Tax compliance” 
 (Juny 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-04 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J.Ll. (GEAP) 
“Cross-section data, disequilibrium situations and estimated coefficients: evidence from car ownership 
demand” 
 (Juny 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-05 
Jofre-Montseny, J. (IEB); Solé-Ollé, A. (IEB) 
“Tax differentials and agglomeration economies in intraregional firm location” 
 (Juny 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-06 
Álvarez-Albelo, C. (CREB); Hernández-Martín, R.  
“Explaining high economic growth in small tourism countries with a dynamic general equilibrium model” 
 (Juliol 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-07 
Duch, N. (IEB); Montolio, D. (IEB); Mediavilla, M. 
“Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm’s performance: a quasi-experimental approach” 
 (Juliol 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-08 
Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT) 
“Innovation sources and productivity: a quantile regression analysis” 
 (Octubre 2007) 
 
 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
 
 
XREAP2007-09 
Albalate, D. (PPRE-IREA) 
“Shifting death to their Alternatives: The case of Toll Motorways” 
 (Octubre 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-10 
Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT); Garcia-Quevedo, J. (IEB); Teruel-Carrizosa, M. (GRIT) 
“Barriers to innovation and public policy in catalonia” 
 (Novembre 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-11 
Bel, G. (PPRE-IREA); Foote, J.  
“Comparison of recent toll road concession transactions in the United States and France” 
 (Novembre 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-12 
Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT);  
“Innovation, R&D spillovers and productivity: the role of knowledge-intensive services” 
 (Novembre 2007) 
 
 
XREAP2007-13 
Bermúdez Morata, Ll. (RFA-IREA); Guillén Estany, M. (RFA-IREA), Solé Auró, A. (RFA-IREA) 
“Impacto de la inmigración sobre la esperanza de vida en salud y en discapacidad de la población 
española” 
 (Novembre 2007) 
 
XREAP2007-14 
Calaeys, P. (AQR-IREA); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA), Suriñach, J. (AQR-IREA) 
“Fiscal sustainability across government tiers” 
 (Desembre 2007) 
 
XREAP2007-15 
Sánchez Hugalbe, A. (IEB) 
“Influencia de la inmigración en la elección escolar” 
 (Desembre 2007) 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
2008 
 
 
XREAP2008-01 
Durán Weitkamp, C. (GRIT); Martín Bofarull, M. (GRIT) ; Pablo Martí, F. 
“Economic effects of road accessibility in the Pyrenees: User perspective” 
(Gener 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-02 
Díaz-Serrano, L.; Stoyanova, A. P. (CREB) 
“The Causal Relationship between Individual’s Choice Behavior and Self-Reported Satisfaction: the Case 
of Residential Mobility in the EU” 
(Març 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-03 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J. L. (GEAP); Roig, J. L. (GEAP) 
“Car ownership and access to jobs in Spain” 
(Abril 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-04 
Bel, G. (PPRE-IREA) ; Fageda, X. (PPRE-IREA) 
“Privatization and competition in the delivery of local services: An empirical examination of the dual 
market hypothesis” 
(Abril 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-05 
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J. L. (GEAP); Roig, J. L. (GEAP)  
“Job accessibility and employment probability” 
(Maig 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-06 
Basher, S. A.; Carrión, J. Ll. (AQR-IREA) 
Deconstructing Shocks and Persistence in OECD Real Exchange Rates  
(Juny 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-07 
Sanromá, E. (IEB); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA); Simón, H.  
Portabilidad del capital humano y asimilación de los inmigrantes. Evidencia para España 
(Juliol 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-08 
Basher, S. A.; Carrión, J. Ll. (AQR-IREA) 
Price level convergence, purchasing power parity and multiple structural breaks: An application to US 
cities 
(Juliol 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-09 
Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA) 
A priori ratemaking using bivariate poisson regression models 
(Juliol 2008) 
 
 
SÈRIE DE DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DE LA XREAP 
 
 
XREAP2008-10 
Solé-Ollé, A. (IEB), Hortas Rico, M. (IEB) 
Does urban sprawl increase the costs of providing local public services? Evidence from Spanish 
municipalities 
(Novembre 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-11 
Teruel-Carrizosa, M. (GRIT), Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT) 
Immigration and Firm Growth: Evidence from Spanish cities 
(Novembre 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-12 
Duch-Brown, N. (IEB), García-Quevedo, J. (IEB), Montolio, D. (IEB) 
Assessing the assignation of public subsidies: Do the experts choose the most efficient R&D projects? 
(Novembre 2008) 
 
XREAP2008-13 
Bilotkach, V., Fageda, X. (PPRE-IREA), Flores-Fillol, R. 
Scheduled service versus personal transportation: the role of distance 
(Desembre 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xreap@pcb.ub.es 
